UN peacekeeping operations

UN peacekeeping operations â€Å"Why are the UN peacekeeping operations rarely successful? Explain using appropriate examples†. A. Introduction With the end of the Cold War, a new generation of peacekeeping operation was born. On the one hand, the deadlock situation lived before in the Security Council was overcame for a more coordinated one. On the other hand, â€Å"almost all new armed conflicts have occurred within the territories of a sovereign state† (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p.3). This new frame claimed for a more robust peacekeeping operations able to deal with intrastate conflicts. As the 1990s passed, UN experienced difficulties to reach it objectives, changing the initial optimism for a more pessimistic position. The complexity of intrastate conflicts -waged within the population, with weak governments and serious humanitarian problems- required multidimensional peacekeeping missions. During this decade, interventions into states in conflict were justified as humanitarian intervention. Peace operations carried on during this time leaved a negative trace -Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda. The rarely successful of UN peace operations drove the organization to consider a serious change on the peace operation structure. The lack of consistency and determination of the mandates could not be sustained any longer. In words of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan peace operations are meant â€Å"(†¦) to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or -when neither of those things is possible- at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading† (Kofi Annan, 1999, p.4). The results of this change of lenses are the UN mandates in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL 1999-2005) and Haiti MINUSTAH (2004-Present). However, further consequences of this shift will come with the consolidation of the Brahimi Report (2000) in future missions. The aim of the present essay is to offer a critical analysis of the effectiveness of UN peace operations launched in the post-Cold War period, supporting the arguments with examples of the most controversial peace operations of 1990s -UNOSOM and UNAMIR. To get this approach, the structure of this essay is composed by three sections. This first one introduces the main characteristic of peace operations, articulating an understanding of the modus operandis of UN and the key problems. The second section comments the main difficulties that the coordination between the political sphere (UN) and the operational sphere (battlefield) has been facing in concrete situations -Somalia and Rwanda- showing the deterministic connection of events. Finally, a brief conclusion with the main findings and future expectations. B. Burying the seed of failure. ‘Peacekeeping is a complicated concept with complicated uses. Being the result of a difficult coordination between the political sphere UN, Secretary-General, Security Council and Member States and the operational sphere type of conflict, geographical area, and parties confronted-, peacekeeping operations lacked the consistency that should had to be effective. The problems begin with the absence of a definition of peacekeeping in the Charter of United Nations. There is no specific Article of Chapter that refers precisely to what peacekeeping operation entails, the criteria to establish it, or guidelines for it deployment.[1] According to the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992) peace operations concern ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, with the aim to terminate the conflict and recover security in the region. Peacekeeping forces are meant to protect civilians, provide aid, supervised ceasefires, military demobilization and elections in order to bring back the state in conflict into peace and stability. As a result, peace operations during the 1990s were characterized for more complex affairs and much longer duration represented by multidimensional missions. Peace operations are, according to Fridley (2002), all UN missions involving military personnel, mandated by the Security Council and operating under the UN command. Four types of peacekeeping operations can be distinguished: (i) observation missions, (ii) traditional peacekeeping missions, (iii) multidimensional missions, and (iv) enforcement missions. The first three are resolutions taking under the Chapter VI, while the last one is under the Chapter VII (Fortna, 2006, p.6-7). Growing in complexity from one to four, the last two are applied more often since the end of the Cold War to end the conflict and improve the prospects for peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). However, the optimism for a wider peacekeeping with more resources defined by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for peace (1992), ended with the opposite results than those expected. I argue in this essay that UN peacekeeping operations rarely succeed due to problems of coordination and determination. Let me go into the main handicaps. Political Sphere United Nations peace operations, as mentioned above, are the result of a mandate emanated from the Security Council (SC). Composed by fifteen members, five of them permanent and with veto power China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States (P5) -, the SC is responsible to make resolution after a recommendation for peace mission made by the Secretary-General. To approve the mandate, its required a majority of nine members. Besides the coordination needed to get the minimum votes, the resolution can be block by one of the P5. The decision of one of the members to use the veto power depends on her interest and aspirations the veto problem. This is the first setback on the way to peace. For example, in January of 1997 China used its veto power to block a peace mission to Guatemala designed to verify Guatemalas signed peace accords. The reason why China took this decision was because she did not like Guatemalas close ties to Taiwan.[2] During the process to approve a Resolution, other problems can emerge. The ‘posturing problem is the drafting of an elaborated and abstract resolution that most of the time does not contain what is needed to solve the conflict -too weak, or too pretentious This was the case of Somalia; one of the objectives of UNOSOM II was the disarmament of the militias, however, the implementation of the mandate was not feasible, specially after the withdraw of USA troops. The ‘coordination problem arrives when the great powers should define the nature of the conflict and take the most effective way to solve it; this is the crux for a appropriate design of a successful operation. However, this coordination problem is the responsible of deliberately vague mandates and a mode to get consensus between the members of the SC. Once a mandate is approved by the SC as a Resolution, the deployment of the peace forces depend on the contribution from Member States, as it is specified in the Fact Sheet of United Nations Peacekeeping. However, the authorization of the deployment does not guarantee its effectiveness.[3] As I discuss next, these inconveniences at the political level affect the operational one; a delayed resolution and an inadequate strategy have terrible consequences on the final result of the peace operation Rwanda (1993), MINURCA (1998).[4] Operational Sphere Intrastate conflicts are difficult to solve. The fundamental distinction between types of civil wars -ethnic, separatism, religion- and the parties involved make each conflict different not only the operational level, but also in the political articulation of it (Byman and Seybolt, 2003). This information should be taken into consideration for the SC to articulate a mandate that responds to the situation. But, the SC responses are not as straight forward. Crisis and its answers are shaped by the decision of those that compose the SC, who are determined by their interest and the internal situation of their country as it was mentioned before with China in 1997. However, when the conflict is considered ‘a threat to peace and the SC is able to articulate a Resolution, the intervention should be legitimized. Intervention can only take place when the state is (i) engaging in a systematic human right violations, (ii) is incapable of protecting human right violations due to the breakdown of the state authority, or (iii) when the government in power is unlawfully constituted (Semb, 2000). Justified in terms of humanitarian claims under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42)[5], the intervention must have the voluntary consent of the parties to the presence and activity involved in the mission[6]. (Fridley, 2002). The mandate is to relieve humanitarian crisis, as it was the case of Somalia (UN OSOM 1993) when the state breakdown. The success of the operational sphere depends, then, on the adequacy between the mandate and the conflict situation. Coordination The two spheres must be well coordinated to terminate the conflict. Different situation can be originated from this. It could be the case that the lack of interest form the member states to intervene generates the absence of intervention or a more complicated bargaining process to involve state members on the mission . As Wilson (2003) stress, â€Å"in the post-Cold War era the absence of a UN military capacity has meant that when the SC has at least been able to use its Character VII powers at an unprecedented rate, it has been forced to rely on a decentralized approach to enforcement the action and entrust operations to those actors willing to conduct them on its behalf†. Most of the time, this calculation is made in terms of cost-benefit analysis; when the conflict provides more loses than gains, the state will be reluctant to provide troops at the beginning of Rwanda crisis in 1993, most Member States where not interested to intervene. But, this is a double-sided sword. States can also see the opportunity to defend her interest as it was the case of UK in Sierra Leone in 1999 and Franc e in Rwanda. It could also be the case that the SC approves a Resolution and Member States agree to provide the troops as it was the case of USA with Bosnia (1992) and Somalia (1992) respectively. However, when the purpose of the mission is not clear, the precision on the solving-conflict situation is inexistent and incoherent, creating a disarticulates mission. This difficulty can be solved. Resolutions already deployed are reinforced by the events on the conflict area; a new Resolution can then answer the needs of the conflict. This was the case, for example, of UNOSOM I and a later UNOSOM II. However, when the Secretariat is not supportive enough, there is not real response to the conflict situation, and then, the mission failed Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali with UNAMIR. The complexity of levels and coordination between the spheres and within them are not following any patter. Although, the interdependence between decision-making -systematic setbacks that decrease the possibilities to obtain a coherent mandate- and conflict events -the necessity of a strong mandate to operate consistently- determines the character and effectiveness of the mission. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) address the vagueness of this UN internal process, â€Å"standards of the UN provide little guidance as to the actual decisions of the Security Council regarding when and where peacekeepers will be deployed†. This links the criteria problem; UN decision between Chapter VI or Chapter VII to generate the mandate that will determine the core of the peace operation. Mandates under Chapter VI lack the strength needed UNMOP (1996-2002) -, and mandates of enforcement under Chapter VII are costly for state members UNOSOM (1992-1995).[7] The inadequacy of institutional structure to respond effectively, the intermittent communication between spheres, and the vacuity of the mandates ended with the dominant tendency to fail. By the end of 1990s, UN was aware of this setback. The result to this declined support for peacekeeping operations was the Brahimi Report (2000). Composed by fifty-seven explicit recommendations and over one hundred implicit ones, it was prepared for the Millennium Summit. It claims for a relation between the magnitude of the conflict and the resourced and supported operation deployed to solve it. It also stresses (i) the need of criteria to avoid the intervention in conflicts that cannot be solved, and well-supported plans when it is required an intervention; (ii) a better understanding of the conflict, and coherence between the mandate and the real situation. (iii) This implies more flexible administrations rules capable to show in the Resolution a â€Å"greater delegation of authority to the field†; (iv) Clear and concrete mandates; (v) and, last but not least, a rapid deployment of the peace operation to be ready to operate within week six and twelve. Since then, a slightly modified typology has been applied. Mission as UN MIL (2003-Present), MINUSTAH (2004-Present), and UNAMID (2007-Present) were designed under this focus.[8] From my point of view, this repost stresses the most controversial points that generate inappropriate mandates. However, this only recommends certain actions on the operational sphere that can help to increase the effectiveness of the peace missions. It does not mention that the problem of coordination also involves part of the structure of UN. Even though it is possible to improve the articulation between the two spheres, states members can provide or move back troops from the operation if they consider it appropriate, interest will remain in the atmosphere of the SC, and the criteria for intervention will depend on the SC decision. Hence, the Brahimi Report is a valid document to improve the immediate problems, but does not mention the roots of them. C. Harvesting failures. The problematic coordination between the political level and the operational one, and also problems within the structure of peacekeeping operations, carry with it another obstacle: time. Since the beginning of the conflict till the deployment of the peace forces, the conflict has different picks of intensity. During this time, more elements are involved in the conflict (children soldiers, natural resources) and more destruction is generated (infrastructure, deaths, famine, etc). The longer it takes to deploy the peace operation, the more complex it will be to solve the magnitude of the problem. And this was the case of most UN peace operations during the 1990s. Nonetheless, the complexity and wide range of areas that the mission should cover, made the peace operations complicated to assess. A problem arrives then, the criteria to determine how much forces and commitments should be taken to solve each conflict. It is generally argued that UN â€Å"should have been done less in Somalia, and cold have done much more in Rwanda† (Frarrel, 2007). The case of MONUC (1999-Present), UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is a good example. The recommended force of 6,000 troops is too small to present a credible military deterrence, but is too large for a symbolic presence considering the extension of the territory; the lack of infrastructure represented and extra complication to an already difficult operation. In same line of a criteria problem, we also have the lack of consistency in the decision-making of UN -discussed in the former section. Generally, in peace operations, the objectives are not well defined. Mandates produced by the UNSC can be indecisive, written with abstract concepts that make its application inconsistent with the real conflict -too pretentious for the force deployed or too scarce for the actual need. Military commanders will applied the mandate as precisely as possible to solve the actual situation where they find, but this does not solve the problem. The unity of command is another setback. On the one hand, troops are provided by a number of Member States, with different training and equipment. The motley composition of troops needs to operate with determination, a good coordination and synchronization. However, such adequation in time and space is nearly idealistic. On the other hand, the states members that provided troops can end their cooperation to the mission if they consider that their troops are in serious threat cost-benefit analysis. This was the case of USA in Somalia during UNOSOM II, who showed to be really sensitive to casualties withdrawing its forces after the death of eighteen soldiers. Here I describe two of the most sounded UN peace missions that gather together all the difficulties mentioned before: UNOSOM, and UNAMIR.[9] The reason why I chose these two cases is the relation that connects the two: the passive reaction to the later one was a consequence of the negative results of the former. The first conflict represents the new challenges that peace operations faced at the beginning of the 1990s. The second one a passive attitude toward the conflict, consequence of the Bosnia (1992-1995) and Somalia (1992-1995) failures. Somalia (1992-1995) United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed in mid-1992 when the country reached the lower situation of her civil war and a terrible famine hit her population. The civil conflict took the country into a complete anarchic situation, where the distribution of aid failed landlords manipulated it as power. By the end of the summer of 1992, 300,000 Somalis were dead. The UNSC approved the Resolution 794 to let UNITAF, a US 37,000-strong force, to resolve the situation and establish the adequate situation for a proper distribution of aid. However, by December 1992, 95% of the population was malnourished and 70% in imminent danger of death by starvation (Western, 2002, p.115). The mandate was created to demilitarized zones to get a better distribution of the aid. In mid-1993 UNOSOM II was deployed with 28,000-strong UN force to fulfil a more ambitious mandate: the disarmament of the parties and the reconstruction of the Somalia government. However, all the efforts were truncated; the ceasefire with the warlords was broken when the paramilitary group attacked a UN patrol killing twenty-four Pakistani soldiers. UNSC Resolution 837 determined the end of the conflict; but the result was the opposite when the 3rd of October of 1994 a US helicopter was shot down; eighteen US soldier were killed. The Clinton administration withdraws her troops within months and UNOSOM II kept active till 1995 without a strong leadership and too ambitious objectives to be accomplished. [10] Even though the money invested and the strong military presence in Somalia, UNOSOM II failed in its mandate: to restore a long-term order. The difficulties faced in Somalia made the Security Council members reluctant to engage in similar conflicts, the passive reaction to the genocide in Rwanda can be explained under this focus (Semb 2000). Rwanda (1993-1994) The ethnic conflict in Rwanda ended in a terrible massacre of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The precedent of such irrational situation was an instable political situation when the Hutu-moderate government introduced a multi-party democracy that ended with the exclusion of the Hutu extremists.[11] This radical faction started a terror camping, after the accidental death of the President, to exterminate the Tutsi population of the country. By April of 1993, when the genocide started, there was a UN peacekeeping force with a limited mandated deployed in Rwanda. Composed by 2,500-strong United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was designed to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.[12] The peace operation was â€Å"understaffed, under-resourced, and unauthorized to use force to prevent crimes†.[13] The UN response the 27th of April was inadequate: to re-establish the ceasefire. The awaited Resolution 918 to expand UNAMIR to 5,500 troops to protect the population arrived the 17th of May, too late. By July the genocide was already committed. The disintegrated situation in Rwanda was denounced by the UNAMIR Force Commander, Major General Romà ©o Dollaire, in February 1993. The UN could have been able to do much more; if not to stop the genocide, at least it could have reduced the terrible consequences of it. Boutros-Ghali was unable to push an adequate resolution and the SC was blocked by USA and UK. It can be appreciate from the examples examined the difference of commitment to bring into an end the conflict. However, both situation ended in failure. Both cases have in common the weak coordination between the political and operational spheres that generated late and inconsistent mandates. Somalia demonstrates the compromise of USA to finish it, but in the end the situation was reversed and such commitment was shown not to be that strong. Rwanda is in the opposite side of the spectrum, there was no interest part as the failure of Somalia for intervention. After a decade of rarely successful operation, the ‘credibility of UN was damaged, as it was assumed by the UNSC in November 2000, Resolution 1327. D. Conclusion: awaiting for a better harvest. The main reasons why UN peacekeeping operations during 1990s rarely succeeded were problems with coordination to approve a resolution and the inconsistence of delayed responses. I argued that the intensity of the conflict aggravated through this ‘decision time determined the structure, durability, complexity, and the final balance of these peacekeeping operation. In a simple line, we can say that the objective of the UN forces were not clear by the time they went into the conflict area. This triggered a whole succession of complications such as a deficient coordination, an irregular institutional behaviour, and the lack of criteria to establish the adequate measure of forces. Missions were then no strong enough to be able to take robust actions against peace spoilers. Overall, missions tended to fail. As I argued before, the complexity of intrastate conflicts and the corresponding peace operation can get worse rather than better if (i) the expected peace operations has not a clear objectives already designed by the time of it implementation, (ii) there is no coordination between the area of the conflict and the SC to empower the strategy to wage the conflict, and (iii) if there is no suitable ‘time-reaction from the authorities to operate on the conflictive area to stop the violence. Conflicts experience different waves of violence, and the grade of destruction increases when the peace forces are not effective. So, the longer the conflict, the more elements are involved, and the more complex the peace operation should be to re-establish peace (e.g. Children soldiers, infrastructure, mechanism of corruption, etc). In other words, the longer to make a resolution and deploy the peacekeeping troops with a specific and consistent mandate, the less effective the operation will be. The structural and functional problems considered here made clear a claim for robust mandates, that is, the implementation of the appropriate force to achieve the mission mandate, to protect civilian in danger, and provide the suitable condition to deploy the mission (Yamashita, 2008). A strong justification must support this type of robust mandates. As it was the case of Sierra Leone in 1999 (UNAMSIL); the Resolution 1313 of the 4th of August of 2000 was the result of the breakdown of the Agreement. This Resolution authorized peacekeepers to deter and counter the threat of RUF responding robustly to any imminent direct use of force (Yamashita, 2008 p. 620). This new direction of peacekeeping has also its institutional consequences. Recently published, the 2008 Principles and Guidelines Material for Peacekeeping[14] outlines the interconnection between the two spheres mentioned before. In order to get that, the SC decisions are influenced by the agreement reached and the parties that compose the conflict. The result of a good coordination will produce a suitable mandate for the conflict see also the Brahimi Repost already mentioned. To sum up, peacekeeping is not risk free, this is the main reason why if UN is going to intervene in a conflict must do it with the strength and consistency required for an effective action. Once the operation is in the conflict, it must be able to complete the mission successfully fruit of the satisfactory coordination between the political sphere and the operational one being able to bring peace where it is needed.[15] The actual deployed missions generated under this new wave of peace keeping MINUSTAH (2004-Present), UMIT (2006-Present), UNAMID (2007-Present) will show if the coordination and consistency problems, that were the pulse under which peacekeeping was shaped during the 1990s, has been solved. E. Bibliography. Annan, K. â€Å"Reflections on Intervention† in Kofi Annan, The question of Intervention, New York: United Nations, 1999. A.J. Bellamy, ‘The â€Å"Next Stage† in Peace Operations Theory? International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 17-38. J. Boulden (ed.) Dealing with conflict in Africa. (London: Palgrave-McMillan, 2003). D. Byman T. Seybolt, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars: Problems and Alternative Approaches, Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), pp.33-78. Donald, ‘Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peace-keeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century, International Peace-keeping, Vol. 9., No. 4, (2002), pp. 21-38. J. Darby R. MacGintty, (eds), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, (London, Palgrave, 2003) Doyle and Sambanis (2000) â€Å"International Peacebuilding: A theoretical And Quantitative Analysis† American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec. 2000), pp. 779-801. David M. Edelstein, ‘Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 49-91. Also useful for following week. T. Farrell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations, in J. Baylis, J. Wirtz et al, (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An introduction to strategic studies, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 313-334. Fortna, V. (2006). Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents choices after civil war. Oxford: Princeton University. Fortna, V. (2004) â€Å"Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War†. In International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun. 2004), pp. 269-292. Findlay, T. (2002) The use of force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. M. Goulding, ‘The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, International Affairs, Vol 69, No 3, 1993, pp. 451-464. J-M. Guehenno, ‘On Challenges and achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations, International Peacekeeping, Vol 9, No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 69-80. Guilligan and Stedman (2003) â€Å"Where do the Peacekeepers Go?† International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec. 2003), pp. 37-54. M. Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 39-58. A. J. Semb, ‘The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference?, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 4, (2000), pp.469-488. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996). J. Western, ‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 112-142. G. Wilson, ‘UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organisations versus ‘Coalitions of the Willing, International Peace-keeping, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Summer 2003), pp. 89-106. H. Yamashita, Impartial Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, Vol 15, No 5 November 2008, pp. 615 630. [1] J.M. Guà ©henno (2002) [2] Francisco Villagran de Leon, Embassador of Guatemala to Canada (January 1997) for the New York Time, available at [3] The P5 has had the tendency to pas the resolutions, but has not been able to provide the means. [4] Edelstein (2004) [5] Semb (2000) [6] This can take place once a ceasefire agreement for the deployment of peace forces was reached. [7] Doyle and Sambanis, 2006. [8] For more detailed information, [9] Due to the complexity of the intra-state conflicts, I do not discuss the historical facts that composed the each of these operations. I will only concentrate in those events that where significant for the failure of the mission and that allow me to establish a critical analysis of the cases. [10] The United Nations and Somalia (1996), Boulden (2003) [11] Wilson (2003) [12] Boulden (2003). [13] Farrel, T. (2007) p. 320 [14] Available at [15] â€Å"Military intervention is a nasty business. It should never be the first option considered, but sometimes it is the only choice† (Beyman and Seybolt, 2003 p. 77). UN Peacekeeping Operations UN Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping was never has been mentioned in the UN Charter, but it has been a very effective means to respond to regional conflicts or civil wars. Peacekeeping, according to Mingst and Karns (2000), is the respond to deadlock of the Security Council to intervene civil wars due to the great veto powers. It helps the implementation of cease-firing agreement, prevents hostilities and it uses troops and civilian personals from the member states that voluntarily contributes their personals. It was first used, he adds, in the late 1940s to monitor the cease-fire agreeing in the land of Palestine and Kashmir. Since 1991, The UN has deployed many peacekeeping operations. It was launched in such countries as, Angola, El Salvador, Western Haiti, Cambodia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia etcà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦. Some of which were successful, yet some of which were not. Here, we will only examine on the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR). We will discover whether or not the UNAMIR was successful. Firs t, we will go briefly through the root cause of the conflict inside Rwanda. Second, we will look at UNAMIR mandate to see what task it was assigned to undertake. Later, as it is well-known that this peacekeeping operation was a failure, we will examine on why it was not able to fulfill its job. Yet, we still believe that there were some positive points of this operation too. Therefore, we will also find out what are all those points are. At last, we will come to the conclusion with the outcome of UNAMIR, and answer the objective question, Was the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda successful or not? Root Causes of the Conflict In order to understand the root causes of civil war inside Rwanda we need to look back to colonial periods. In one of her research, Heleta (2006) illustrates that Rwanda was made up of majority Hutus and Minority Tutsis. Hutus were mainly lower class people whereas Tutsis were mainly the nobles. They spoke the same language and lived side by side, yet they sometimes intermarried. Since 1890, according to Howard, Rwanda was under the colonization of Germany, and Belgium after the end of World War I. During colonial period, minority Tutsis was in favor of both colonial masters. Rwanda gained independence in 1962 after the majority Hutus raised up against Belgium, who promoted and placed many Tutsis in many positions of the administration. They also threatened the Tutsis to leave the country. Eventually, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, in 1973, created an authoritarian government after staging a coup. Bruce says, the civil war erupted when Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a mo vement which was mainly made of Tutsis, started the offensive in from Ugandan-Rwandan border. After a series of fighting between the RPF and the FAR (Forces Armà ©ss Rwandise) or the government military; and many negotiations resulted in cease firing that did not really last for long, the two warring parties agreed on Arusha Agreement of August 4, 1993. During the peace talks progress, Howard says, a new Hutu movement started to gained power and established their own militias to disrupt the peace talk and reconciliation. This is the Hutu extremist group that plans the genocide of the minority Tutsis. Heleta (2006) says, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦Hutu radicals, who saw no other solution to the Hutu-Tutsi problem but to exterminate the entire Tutsis Population in Rwanda. The Arusha agreement was signed by both warring parties, and both parties consented the UN intervention to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. UNAMIR Mandate The UN resolution of peacekeeping operation is authorized by the Security Council to determine the size and its mandate in which any decision requires at least nine out of 15 votes, and is subject to a veto by any of the five permanent members- United States, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, France, and China. Importantly, to implement the peacekeeping operation, the member states are asked to voluntarily contribute in term of troops and civilian polices, equipment, supplies, transportation, and logistical support, and also the General Assembly is responsible for approval of budget and resources of the mission. Each and every United Nation peacekeeping operation is implemented with its own purposes and objectives. A paper that unequivocally describes the purpose and objectives is called mandate. Now we will examine what UNAMIR was originally assigned to do. From the outset, UNAMIR was created to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha agreement. The mandate stated that UNAMIR would observe the cease-fire, provide security and stability in Kigali, ensure the disarmament and create the non-military zone, assist in land mine clearance activity, monitor human right and the return of refugees, and prepare for the election. As it was implemented under the Chapter VI of the UN, the use of its force was strictly limited for only self-defense (Howard, 2008). Later, after the eruption of the mass killing, UNAMIR mandate was extended to mediate the two warring parties, protect the civilian who sought refuge with UNAMIR and provide many other humanitarian aids (Bruce, 2007). UNAMIR did receive consent from both warring parties, but why was it impossible to achieve? We will answer this question in the following section. Failure and Causes Why it is a failure? The outbreak of the genocide in the face of the presence of the UN peacekeeper clearly demonstrates that the mission is a failure. According to Howard (2008), the mission was mandated to maintain peace, security and stability inside the country, but apparently it could not accomplish its tasks. The genocide killed approximately 800,000 people in just over 100 days. The UN peacekeeper was not able to respond when they were under attack from the Hutu extremists. They proved to be militarily weak, when 10 Belgium peacekeepers were killed and no respond was given from them. Instead of giving any response, the Belgium withdrew all their force; this paved the way for the genocide. What could have been worse while UNAMIR could not even prevent the outbreak of the genocide, and UNAMIR also was voted to reduce its size for the operation? In the following section, we will examine what were the obstacles, impediments and other contributing causes that contribute to its frustrating failure. What made it a failure? The failure of United Nation Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda was result many contributing causes. The major cause is the lack of political interests from member states, especially the United States, the most prominent member of the United Nation Security Council, to take any action in response to the crisis. Howard (2008) argues that the Security Council intentionally did not want to identify the problem, the genocide. None of the members inside the council would dare to challenge the new disinterest of the US. The reason of the disinterest, he adds, was the incident of October 5 1993, in which the US rangers died in Somalia. The encouragement of new peacekeeping operation also declined. Similarly, the Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, was dysfunctional. The report of violence in April 1994 in Rwanda did not come into the hand of him in time. The Secretary-General was touring around Europe, and came back to New York only a week after the report had been submitted. Eventually, the Secretary-General did produce a report to the Security Council, a mere report. In the report, the Secretary-General did present but did not recommend any of the following suggestion: withdraw all the force, send in massive peace enforcement force, and withdraw majority of the force to save the peacekeepers life while maintaining international community presence inside the country. In the report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General missed one crucial point; identify the violence as genocide. If the report had mentioned about the genocide, the Security would have decisively taken action against it (Howard, 2008). If the Secretary had mention genocide in the report, the action would h ave been taken decisively under Article II and 1948 Genocide Convention. Found in same book, Vaccaro (1996) says The failure [UNAMIR] was twofold: not enough accurate analysis was available to the Council, and the information that was reported seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Some particular members such as US and Belgium endorsed the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the operation, complaining that they were under pressure of the mounting billion dollars operation debt; therefore, they need save up in order to pay off the debt. Besides, the United Kingdom opposed the suggestion of sending more forces into operation arguing that lessons learned from Somalia case proved that stronger force still would not be able to complete its mission, and would even worsen the situation there (Howard,2008). Eventually, the decision to downside the scale of operation was reach unanimously. The US disinterest and Secretary-Generals dysfunction created many problems. As the most prominent member of the council, no member was willing to challenge US. The US did not support the mission in Rwanda; therefore, this leads to many problems such as troop contribution, funding, etcà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Howard (2008) states, The council did not recommend adequate funding nor did countries provide adequate troops, given the extensive mandate assigned to UNAMIR. Jones (2007) argues that the political uncertainty during the birth of UNAMIR illustrates its destiny. Such uncertainty would provide limited implementation of its mandate, communication to its political master to respond to the problem effectively. Not only the Secretary-General that was dysfunctional, the UN headquarter also was. A report, known as black file by Canadian Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire, was sent to the UN headquarter. The report explained the plan for genocide that was not planned by President Habyarimana but by a group of Hutu extremist. It also stated the plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers to provoke the withdrawal of them, and kill all the Tutsis. The information of this report was given by a high-level official in the government who gave this information in the return of protection from the UN. When the report come into the UN headquarter, it was put aside and ignore. General Dallaire was only told to alert Belgian, French, and US, and not to attack the weapon warehouse that he wanted to. Three months later, everything mentioned in the report became real. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed along with Prime Minister Agathe Uwlingiyimana. Another contributing cause to the failure is the finance and logistic problems. The deployment of the UN peacekeeper to Rwanda was conducted in such a very slow manner. Jones (2007) describes the UNAMIR as financially and logistically very weak. He explains that the force was deployed in small detachment rather than concentrated force. The deployment of such small detachment did not provide much deterrence, and proved to be weak when the ten Belgium peacekeepers were killed by the extremist Rwandan. In term of financing the operation, it received its budget installment 8 months after the budget planned went to the UN Fifth Committee; the Advisory Committee on Activities and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). Its budget was endorsed only two days before the genocidal attack broke out, and ultimately received all its financial support one month after the attack had stopped. Moreover, UNAMIR never obtained critical asset such as intelligence capacity and defensive equipments (Jones, 2007). UNAMIR was only equipped with such armored personal carriers that was contributed from the UN operation in Mozambique. Many of those were not working, and this proved no sign in respond to the genocide. And when they were not equipped with advanced equipment, how could they face with the army with such sophisticated weapon? According to its mandate, UNAMIR was deployed under the Chapter VI. Therefore, the weakness of UNAMIR lays in its mandate, in which it was stated that the use of force was strictly limited to only for self-defense. Jones (2007) argues that this weakness contribute a lot to the failure. When the genocide broke out, the UN peacekeepers were not able to respond and to confront the army with such sophisticated weapons. Moreover, the collecting weapon method was not included in its mandate. Howard stressed that While the Secretary-General had recommended that the force be charged with collective weapons as a way to enhance the security, the Council did not include the provision in the mandate. After the killing of the Belgium peacekeepers, Belgium government unilaterally withdrew its own force from Rwanda to prevent further causalities of their personals. According to Jones (2007), this action is called Non-response. Belgium did not seek for further method to keep peace inside the region, but they withdrew their own force and this decreased moral of the other peacekeepers there. They did not only withdraw their force, they also persuaded the others troop contributing nations to do so as well. Obviously, they did this because they wanted to lower their embarrassment. This would make the peacekeeping force even weaker, and also made other countries reluctant to contribute their force. Even the new reinforcement of UNAMIR (later known as UNAMIR II) was approved in December 1994, with the mandate to protect civilians by granting 5,500 peacekeepers; however, there were not adequate troops and equipment to operate its mission. The reason of this is straightforward. UNAMIR II got narrow support from the Security Council with ten votes in favor and five abstentions by China, New Zealand, Brazil, Nigeria, and Pakistan. As a result of no immediate available force to operate, the reinforcement was only deployed in August 1995, by which the genocide had already reached its peak in mid-may and started become less severe (Jones, 2007). In short, UNAMIR II was a humanitarian mission rather than an effective peacekeeping operation. Positive points about UNAMIR The operation of UN in Rwanda is mostly considered as the failure because the lack of resources of UNAMIR in field and the limited political will commitment of UN member states and international community. Even though, they are recognized as the failure; UN had done several commitments to help Rwanda as well. These commitments would be counted as small success for UNs operation. First of all, In October, 1993 the Security Council, by its resolution 872 (1993), established the international force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation and support the transitional Government. In addition, UNAMIR troops managed to protect thousands of Rwandese who took shelter at sites under UNAMIR control. Howard (2008) says, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦some UNAMIR troops had begun to protect civilian against genocidal attacks, which was the morally appropriate action to take civilian protection could have been included as part of a new mandate, but it was not. Next, UNAMIR also continued its efforts to ensure security and stability, support humanitarian assistance, clear landmines and help refugees to resettle. Then, when Rwanda conducted the meeting with the United Nations Development Program in 1996, international donors pledged over $617 million towards the reconstruction of the country, United Nations agencies have continued to provide humanitarian aid and to assist in the return of the refugees. After that, On 8 November 1994, the Security Council established the International Tribunal for Rwanda for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. And UN also support Rwandas national program for capacity building and contribute to the strengthening of local government and local development partner, as well as civil society actor. Conclusion In short, United Nations peacekeeping operation in Rwanda was a failure. Even though, it also had some positive points. Later in this section, we will access a very brief summary, personal analysis and recommendations. Summary UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was created to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Agreement after many bitter fighting between the government and Rwandan Patriotic Front. It was mandated to ensure peace and stability in the capital Kigali, to create weapon-free zone around the city, to help clearing land mines, and to assist the returning of Rwandan refugees. However, it was not a satisfied and successful story. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed by the radical Hutus, and the number of international force was decrease. This paved the way for genocide to break out, which killed almost 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwandan. Disinterest of the member states to deploy the mission in time and effectively, dysfunction of the Secretary-General were the two main reasons contributing to the failure. UNAMIR was also weak in term of financial, logistical, and military, while it was only allowed to use weapon in the means of self-defense. Personal Analysis and Recommendations After examining UNAMIR, we have found its weakness and we also have come out with what could be done to improve future peacekeeping operation. We will begin with our personal analysis. We have found that the most prominent cause of the UNAMIR is the US disinterest in authorizing the mission. After the US peacekeepers were killed in Somalia, the US became reluctant to deploy another mission, fearing further casualties of their soldiers. Therefore, the peacekeeping was lack of leadership. As Jones (2007) says, The political reluctance, which attended the birth of UNAMIR, shaped its destiny. Another significant factors contributing to the failure is the inadequate of the information by the Secretary-General. The report that the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council did not mention the violence as genocide, while it was genocide in every aspects of its but its name. If the Secretary-General had mentioned about the genocide, serious action could have been taken. After giving our own analysis, here we will articulate our recommendation. What should be done to improve the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operation? First, UNAMIR should have been deployed under Chapter VII (peace enforcement) rather than under the Chapter VI. UNAMIR was in no position when the genocide broke out, because its use of weapon had been restricted to only self-defense. Therefore, we suggest that future peacekeeping operation to be deployed under Chapter VII (peace enforcement). If the mission is deployed with a broader use of weapon, the peacekeepers might use it to protect civilian to raid weapons warehouse, and for many other humanitarian purposes. Second, so far we have seen that only after the mission is authorized, then the troops are mobilized. UNAMIR II was authorized, but at that time it did not have immediate available troops, and it needed to wait for the member states to contribute their troops. This is a time wasting process. Therefore, we would sugge st that the peacekeeping troops to be mobilized in advance. In other word, we suggest that UN should have the reserved troops for emergency.